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This paper examines consumer targeting by cost-asymmetric home incumbent and 
foreign entrant under quality and price competition among them in a liberalized 
home-country market. With the home incumbent offering a price-quality menu before the 
foreign entrant offers his menu, the extent to which the home incumbent enjoys a 
home-market advantage over a technologically efficient foreign entrant determines the 
nature of market segmentation. When the home-market advantage is not too large, the home 
incumbent targets accommodates entry by targeting only the low-type home consumers. 
Gains from liberalization, however, depends to a large extent on the distribution of home 
consumers over different types. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper addresses consumer targeting by a foreign entrant competing with a 
single local incumbent in terms of both price and quality of their product in a liberalized 
market with different types of consumers and local incumbent’s response to such 
competition by varying quality of its own product(s). These issues are of interest 
because policy makers in a typical developing country often conceive open trade regime 
as a policy instrument for improving the local technology and product quality.   
Often foreign firms entering an erstwhile protected domestic market are observed to 
offer a higher range of products targeting the high-type consumers. Indian automobile 
 
* This is a revised version of the paper presented at the International Conference on Operations Research 
(ICOR (2004)) held at the Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, during January 8-10, 2004. I thank Sugata 
Marjit and other conference participants for useful comments. Thanks are also due to an anonymous referee 
for helpful suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies, however.   
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market is one such example where despite incumbent Maruti-Suzuki’s popular low 
range product Maruti Standard in the Light Motor Vehicle category, new entrants like 
Hyundai, Fiat and Daewoo concentrate at the high-end of the market for the same 
category passenger car by offering their respective high-price brands Santro, Palio and 
Matiz, respectively. 
An explanation often floated by the businessmen is that targeting consumers at the 
high-end of the market who have a higher marginal willingness-to-pay makes profit 
prospects better than serving all segments of the market. Of course, this possibility arises 
because of imperfect information regarding consumer types: At the separating 
equilibrium the low-type consumers are charged their reservation prices whereas the 
high-types are charged below their reservation prices. This leaves a scope for the firms 
to extract greater surpluses from the high-type consumers as they learn about their true 
types. A critical element of this type of reasoning, however, is some threshold number of 
high-type consumers in relation to the low-types and the differences in their respective 
marginal willingness-to-pay (MWP).   
Another plausible explanation of such market segmentation may be that the MNCs 
have a comparative cost advantage in producing higher quality goods but not in lower 
quality goods. Such cost advantage in higher quality varieties relaxes competition from 
local firms and thus enables the foreign multinationals to extract more surpluses and 
allow them to cover initial high fixed costs of distribution and marketing. Thus, the 
target set of consumers for the MNCs and consequent segmentation of a liberalized 
market between local firms and foreign entrants may be either demand-driven or 
cost-driven.  
Theoretically, the role of demand pattern or distribution of consumers across 
different types in the context of simultaneous entry decision by firms has been 
emphasized by Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983) in their pioneer works and in the 
subsequent development of literature on quality competition. Of late, Acharyya and Roy 
Chowdhury (2004) have also demonstrated that if consumers with low MWP is 
sufficiently large in number, only one firm will enter and monopolize the market at a 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, however small the entry cost is. The significance of 
distribution of consumers across different types in a monopolistic market, on the other 
hand, has earlier been emphasized by Acharyya (1998) in the context of the extent of 
market coverage or consumer targeting; and later by Bandyopadhyay and Acharyya (2004) 
in the context of choice of innovation types. In light of these results, the demand-argument 
for consumer targeting by the new foreign entrants might seem obvious. 
However, these results are established either in case of simultaneous entry with no 
cost asymmetry among firms or when there is no threat of entry for a monopoly firm. 
But simultaneous-entry assumption does not fit well in the context of competition 
among local firms and foreign MNCs as a consequence of trade liberalization in the 
developing countries. It is thus worthwhile to examine whether such results hold even in 
the context of sequential entry, or more relevant, in an incumbent-entrant structure with 
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The analyses that come closest to ours are that of Donnenfeld and Weber (1992) and 
Aoki and Prusa (1996) who examine quality choices by firms when they enter a market 
sequentially. Our analysis, however, differs in two respects. First, we allow for both cost 
asymmetry between firms and non-uniform distribution of consumers to examine what 
roles these might play in the quality competition, for reasons spelled out above. Second, 
the decision structure is slightly different. Instead of the incumbent and the entrant 
sequentially choosing their quality levels and then simultaneously choosing prices, we 
assume that they sequentially choose the whole menu (i.e., the price-quality package). 
This assumption, of course, simplifies the structure of the post-liberalization game, but 
also seems to be more reasonable decision structure in the present context. 
However, the scope of the present analysis is neither kept confined to this particular 
question nor to the specific observation of the Indian automobile industry that we started 
with. Rather, we intend to address the following set of issues in a more general context 
of liberalizing an erstwhile protected market in a developing country. First of all, what 
quality does a foreign entrant choose when it faces competition from an already 
established local firm? Does it offer only a high quality and caters only to the high-type 
local consumers? The second issue relates to how does the incumbent react to such 
threat of entry. Does it downgrade or enhance its quality compared to what it was 
offering before liberalization (and in absence of any threat of entry)?
1 Thirdly, we 
examine what implication does such trade liberalization and quality competition have on 
the welfare of the domestic economy.   
These issues per se are relevant in the more general context of gains from liberal 
trade policies pursued of late by many developing countries. A favourable effect of trade 
liberalization that has been often perceived is that the consequent foreign competition 
per se will induce local incumbents to invest in R&D and enhance quality of their 
products.
2 This coupled with price competition will benefit domestic consumers and 
raise total surplus. The counter argument is that trade liberalization will lower the 
incentive for innovation for the local firms since foreign competition lowers their output 
and profit [Clemenz (1990), Rodrik (1992)]. In the present setting, pro-competitive 
effect of trade liberalization does enhance the quality of local products offered to the 
low-type consumers. But total gains may still be lower than what could be achieved in 
the protected market because of partial loss of markets for local firms. Gains for 
consumers from such quality enhancement at the low-end of the domestic market 
overcompensates the loss of market for the local firm at the high-end of the market only 
when the size of the low-end of the market is sufficiently large, which, in turn, depends on 
the distribution of consumers across different types. Thus, trade liberalization per se does 
not improve welfare of the domestic economy despite enhancement of local quality.   
 
1 Similar issue has been addressed by Kabiraj and Roy (2003) assuming a fixed quality of the foreign 
entrant. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set out the basic model. 
Section 3 discusses consumer targeting by an incumbent and an entrant under quality 
and price competition when the domestic market is liberalized. In Section 3 we examine 
the gains and losses from liberalization that the domestic economy experiences given the 
choices of the firms. Some concluding remarks are provided in Section 5.   
 
 
2.     THE MODEL UNDER AUTARKY 
 
2.1.     Preference Pattern and Technology 
 
Consider an initially protected home-country market with a single domestic firm and 
two types of consumers,   with   number of type   consumers. The 
domestic firm offers a price-quality package    to the   -consumers,  selecting 
quality   from the technologically feasible set 
, 1 2 α α > j n
(
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. The qualities of the good are 
observable to all. Each consumer buys, if at all, only one unit of the good. The net utility 
that type-    consumer derives from the menu   is,  j α
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This linear preference structure satisfies the following properties as is usually 
assumed in the literature [Cooper (1984), Mussa and Rosen (1978)]:   
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where    denotes the marginal utility of quality.    (.) q u
Consumers participate in the market if payoff from a menu is individually rational: 
 
p q j ≥ α .                                                           ( 3 )  
 
On the other hand, menu (  is selected if the corresponding (net) payoff is 
incentive compatible: 
) , 2 2 q p
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Since the firm does not have full information regarding the consumer type, he cannot 
discriminate among the consumers in terms of the price-quality package to the extent to 
which a first-degree discriminating monopolist would have done to extract all surpluses 
from all types of consumers. The discriminatory power of our monopolist domestic firm CONSUMER TARGETING UNDER QUALITY COMPETITION  133
is thus limited and he should set packages according to (4) to avoid mimicking by the 
high-type of the behaviour of the low-type. Consequently, the high-type consumers, at a 
separating (or discriminatory) equilibrium, derive strictly positive net utility.
3 
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where  x denotes the output level. Cost of production has two components: one which 
depends only on the output level,   capturing the cost incurred at the basic stage of 
production for example, and the other which depends on both the quality level and the 
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c cq + , is invariant with respect to 
the output level produced    total as well as marginal cost of production is larger for 
better quality goods. Whereas, the total cost of producing x units increases at the rate 
  the marginal (as well as unit) cost of production increases at the rate   for  each 




2.2.  Pre-Liberalization  Quality  Choices 
 
It is straightforward to check that, pre-liberalization and with no threat of entry by other 
domestic firms, the domestic monopolist offers the following separating menus, if at all: 
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Of course, such a separating menu is profitable only if the composition of the market 
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Otherwise, the monopolist would cater to only the high-type and extract all surpluses 
from them by charging their reservation price:
4  2 2 2
~ ~ q p α = . Figure 1 illustrates such a 
separating (or discriminatory) equilibrium for representative consumers of each type. 
These menus are, however, socially sub-optimum. The socially optimum qualities are 
1
~ q  and   such that social welfare   
is maximum. That is,   
2
~ q )] , ( ) , ( [ )] , ( ) , ( [ 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 q n C q u n q n C q u n W − + − = α α
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with corresponding marginal cost pricing: 
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Comparing these quality levels with those offered by the domestic firm, it is 
immediate that quality distortion occurs at the bottom which is the standard result shown 
by Mussa and Rosen (1978). Thus, unregulated profit maximization results in 
sub-optimal welfare level before liberalization. 
 
 
3.  LIBERALIZATION  AND  CONSUMER  TARGETING 
 
Suppose, the local government allows entry of a foreign firm which has a superior 
production technology than the local incumbent defined below. In face of such entry 
possibility, the local incumbent revises his menu since earlier choices are no longer 
optimal. We assume that the local firm first announces his price-quality menu before the 
foreign firm enters and then the entrant selects his menu observing the choice made by 
the incumbent. This decision structure is different from Donnenfeld & Weber (1992) and 
Aoki & Prusa (1996) who assume that the incumbent and the entrant sequentially choose 
their quality levels and then simultaneously choose prices. 
 
3.1.  Nature  of  Cost  Asymmetry 
 
The entrant has a superior production technology which allows it to produce all 
qualities at a lower marginal cost: 
 
] , 0 [ ) , ( ) , (
* q q q x C q x C q q ∈ ∀ < .                                         ( 1 1 )  
 
But the foreign firm has a higher total as well as marginal cost at the basic stage of 
production:  
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This difference may reflect higher price of some essential or basic inputs use of 
which though do not matter for the quality level produced. Alternatively, this cost 
difference may be due to higher initial cost incurred by the foreign firm towards 
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interpreted as home-market advantage of the domestic firm.
5 Thus, what we assume in 
(11) and (12) is that, though the foreign firm is not as efficient as the home firm at the 
basic stage of production (or at the distribution and marketing stage), he is more efficient 
in developing newer varieties or developing better qualities.   
These assumptions imply that we can define a quality level   such  that,   q ˆ
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Thus for all quality levels beyond q, the foreign entrant has absolute as well 
relative cost advantage. 
ˆ
Given such a nature of cost asymmetry, the following specific form of the cost 
function of the foreign firm will be used to determine choice of menus: 
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The critical level of quality   thus varies with the difference in both the marginal 
cost of quality 
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Figure 2 illustrates the different scenarios. For any given difference in the marginal cost 
of quality (i.e., for any particular value of  β ), a higher difference in fixed costs   
pushes up the foreign cost curve further away from the home cost curve, and therefore, 
increases the range of qualities [  over which the home firm has absolute cost 
advantage in producing those qualities. As we will see later, this degree of cost advantage   
) (
*
o o c c −
] ˆ , 0 q
Is a critical element in determining post-entry competition and consumer targeting and 
consequent market segmentation. Of course, the degree of relative cost advantage (as 
captured by the value of  β ) is equally important. However, we shall confine ourselves 




o o c c −
β   constant, simply because that will allow us to keep the optimal quality choices for 
any target group unchanged as the curvature property of the cost functions (and therefore 
 
5  In Indian automobiles market, Maruti-Suzuki and even the late entrant in the light motor vehicle 
category, Tata, enjoy such a home market advantage over foreign companies like Daweoo and Fiat, through 
their wide distribution and service networks. Hyundai however is fast catching up these companies with its 
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that of the iso-profit functions) will not be disturbed by that thought experiment.   
At this point it is relevant to define the competitive qualities with foreign technology, 
denoted by   as   , ~*
i q
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Given linear preference function defined in (1) and the foreign technology in (13) 
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3.2.    Quality Competition and Consumer Targeting 
 
We assume that firms have complete information regarding their strategies, timing of 
the game, demand structure and nature of cost asymmetry. Thus, the post-liberalization 
competition between the cost asymmetric local incumbent and a foreign entrant is a 
two-stage game of complete and perfect information. The choice of menus or 
price-quality packages can therefore be obtained by backward induction. 
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Figure 2.    Differences in Fixed Costs and Absolute Cost Advantage of Home Firm RAJAT ACHARYYA  138
Finding the quality choices under the assumed sequential decision structure involves 
constructing the best-response function of the entrant and then finding 
profit-maximizing qualities of incumbent given such responses. For any price-quality 
menu    chosen by the home firm for the low-type consumers and corresponding 
incentive compatible menu   chosen for the high-type, the entrant can attract 
both types by offering the same quality q
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1 to the low-type consumers but at a slightly 
lower price than charged by the home incumbent,   and corresponding 
incentive compatible menu    to the high-type consumers to, provided of course 
. But, if  , the foreign entrant offers   to the low-type 
consumers. This follows from the self-selection constraint of the low-type. They strictly 
prefer   offered by the foreign firm to any price-quality menu   offered 
to them by the home firm if, 
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Thus, for a higher quality   than   the entrant can charge 
. Otherwise, she must charge   to attract them. Thus 
foreign entrant’s profit (from such an offer) equals 
*
1 q , 1 q
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in the former case and   in the latter. In any case, however, profit maximization 
yields,   as the optimal quality offered by the foreign firm (which is the same as the 
competitive quality defined in (15a)). Given such an offer to the low-type consumers, 
the menu offered to the high-type must once again be incentive-compatible. In particular, 
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What emerges from this best-response function of the foreign entrant is that by 
charging a price   above   for the quality   offered to the low-type 
consumers, the home firm cannot have a positive demand. But since 
 there is scope for the home firm to attract the low-type 
consumers and yet make non-negative profits by charging a price even below  . 
However, since the best offer that the entrant can make is the menu  , 
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when he offers a quality   and 
*
1 1
~ q q > ε − 1 p   when he offers a  . Of course, the 
home firm will offer such a menu if the price covers its cost of production,  . This 
means the nature of cost asymmetry becomes important. Similarly, from the 
best-response function it is evident that the home incumbent can make positive profit by 
offering an incentive-compatible menu 
*
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Once again such a price must cover its cost,  ) ~ ( 2 q c . What is to be noted that even if 
2 1 1 ), ( p q c p > −ε  may be less than  ) ~ ( 2 q c  given our earlier assumption regarding the 
nature of cost asymmetry. Therefore, specific assumptions regarding the level of critical 
quality  , or regarding the extent of difference in fixed costs,  , are required to 
determine the post-entry choice of menus and consumer targeting. In particular, 
lemma-1 below specifies when the home firm cannot cater to the high-type consumers 
under the threat of foreign competition. Let us define a critical cost difference   such 
that, 
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Lemma 1: For   there is no profitable menu   which the home 
incumbent can offer to the high-types to induce them not to buy the imported variety   
at price  . 
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Proof: Suppose the home firm offers a menu   to the high types. 
Since the second mover foreign firm can always undercut the price as long as p
) , ( 2 2 q p
2 
is greater than the his cost of producing  , and the best offer he can make is 
, the home firm can attract high-types only when he charges 
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* * * δ = − o o c c
c ) ~ , 2 2 q ε − (p  is unprofitable 
for the home firm for all     .
* *
o c
[] 1 p −
* δ ≤ − o c




1 q c p = ) ( 1 1 p q c < <
ε −
ε − ) 1 q − ) ( 1 q c
,
* δ ≤ − o c
) 1
~ , q ε 1 − ~ ( 1 1 q c p =
2 )
Hence the claim.   
 
Therefore, for absolute cost advantages not too large in the sense defined above, the 
home firm cannot offer any menu to high-type consumers when the imported variety is 
available. Thus, monopolist can only cater to the low types and can make strictly 
positive profit,   as  long  as  1 n = π ~ ( ) 1
*
1 1 q q − −α . 
Since for any   profit is maximized for  , 1 q 1 p , the monopolist essentially must 
choose   to  maximize,  1 q
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which yields the competitive quality,  , as defined in (10), as the optimal offer of the 
home incumbent to the low-type consumers. 
1
~ q
Once again the home firm will offer such a menu only if it is profitable, and, as 
lemma-2 states, this is the case when the absolute cost advantage of the home firm is not 
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Substitution of values from (10) and (15a) yields  .  
*
o c
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Since  , what appears from lemma 1 and 2 is that unless the absolute cost 
advantage of the home incumbent is sufficiently high in the sense that  , the 
foreign entrant, having a relative cost advantage 
2 1 α α <
* * δ > − o o c c
), 1 ( < β   will offer menus to attract all 
consumers leaving the incumbent with zero demand. Anticipating a loss by the amount 
of the cost incurred in producing the quality offered in such a case, the home firm does 
not offer any menu at all, and given such an irreversible decision, the foreign entrant 
offers the usual discriminatory monopoly menu(s) to the domestic consumers.   
Therefore, 
 
Proposition 1: For all  , 
* * δ ≤ − o o c c
a) the home incumbent does not offer any menu and the liberalized 
domestic market is monopolized by the foreign firm; 
b) the foreign firm caters to all consumers by offering a separating menu 
only if the demand pattern satisfies (7). 
 
Proof: 
a)  Follows directly from lemma 1 and 2. 
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But    if (7) holds.    0
*
1 > q
Hence proved.   
 
Therefore, for the home incumbent to survive in competition from an entrant who 
has a lower marginal cost of producing qualities, the home firm’s absolute cost 
advantage captured in    must be large enough. For  , he can 
profitably cater to the low-type consumers. 
o o c c −
* * * δ > − o o c c
However, for even larger advantage,  , though he can cater to the 
high-type consumers as well, he may not do so. What lemma 1 states is that for such 
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differences in costs, the home firm can profitably offer the menu  ) ~ , ( 2 2 q p ε −
~ (
* q c
 to the 
high-type consumers which they will prefer to the best-possible menu {  
offered by the foreign entrant. But such a menu must also prohibit the low-type 
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~ ,q p  
offered to them by the home firm. 
Of course, this depends on the parametric value and in case they do mimic, the home 
firm has to decide whether to cater to the high-type at all, depending on the profit levels. 
This because, if the price  2 p  is too low to induce the low-type to mimic the high-type 
consumers, then profit is lower than what the home firm could achieve through the 
separating menu. Following lemma defines the parametric value in this regard: 
 





, the low-type consumers will mimic the high-type consumers by 
purchasing   at  price  ~ q 2 p . 
 
Proof: If the low-type mimics the high-type then by their self-selection constraint the 
following must be true: 
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Substituting values of the quality and price levels, this boils down to 
   () ( ) [] 0 4 3 1 2 1 2 ≥ + − − α α β α α
which is satisfied whenever 
4
3
< β .  
Hence, proved.   
 
Of course, low-types can mimic the high-type consumers even for 
4
3
> β , but to 
keep the analysis simple and avoid multiplicity of cases we shall confine ourselves with 
4
3
< β   in rest of the analysis.   
Thus, given this assumption, the low-type consumers mimic the high-type 
consumers when the home firm offers the menu  ) ~ , ( 2 2 q p ε −  to the high-type 
consumers. The home firm then has to decide whether to cater to only the low-type by 
offering the menu ( ) 1 1
~ , q p , leaving the high-end of the market to the foreign firm, 
depending on the profit levels.   
Clearly, the relative size of the low-type consumers would be a critical element 
underlying such a decision. When the home firm caters only to the low-type and CONSUMER TARGETING UNDER QUALITY COMPETITION  143
accommodates entry of the foreign firm in the higher segment, he secures for himself a 
profit equal to, 
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On the other hand, if he offers  ) ~ , ( 2 2 q p ε −   targeted at the high-type consumers, by 
lemma 3, low-type consumers also buy this menu resulting in a profit for the home firm 
equal to, 
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For  ε   infinitesimally small, we can write 
 








Proposition 2: Even when offering the menu  ) ~ , ( 2 2 q p ε −   to the high-type consumers is 
feasible and profitable, the home firm targets only the low-type 
consumers if they are sufficiently large in the sense defined in (26) below. 
 
Proof:  
By lemma 1, the home firm can make positive profit by offering the menu  ) ~ , ( 2 2 q p ε −  
to the high-type consumers when  ( )
* * * δ > − o o c c . But by lemma 3, such a menu will 
attract the low-type consumers also as it gives them strictly higher net utility than the 
menu  ( ) 1 1
~ , q p
() 1 α π
 targeted at them. Consequently, the home firm realizes π. But by not 
offering the menu to the high-type consumers and targeting only the low-type consumers 
he gets  . From (25) it is immediate that targeting only the low-type consumers is 
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Hence proved.   
 
The condition (26) can alternatively be written as, 
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Thus, for home market advantage of the home firm in the range  [ ]
* * * * * ,δ δ , even 
though he can forestall entry of the foreign firm in the high-segment of the market, he 
accommodates such entry by targeting only the low-type consumers. Of course, 





, larger is the home market 
advantage for which the home firm will accommodate entry of the foreign firm in the 
high-segment of the market. Therefore, 
 
Proposition 3:   
a) Post liberalization, both firms will operate in the market for home 
market advantages in the range [ ]
* * * *,δ δ . The home incumbent will 
target the low-type consumers and the foreign firm will cater to the 
high-type consumers.   
b) For  , the foreign firm will not enter the market even for a 
very small entry cost.     
()
* * * * δ > − o o c c
 
Proof: 
a) By lemma 1 and 2, for all  () [ ]
* * * * ,δ δ ∈ − o o c c , the home firm can profitably offer the 
menu  ( ) 1 1
~ , q p  to the low-type for which the foreign firm cannot have a positive 
demand for its low-quality variety. On the other hand, by Proposition 2 and (27) it 
follows that for all () [ ]
* * * * * ,δ δ ∈
* − o o c c , the home firm targets only the low-type 
consumers. 
What remains to be shown that for all such home market (dis-)advantages, the foreign 
firm can have positive demand for its high-quality variety from the high-type consumers, 
and earn strictly positive profit. Note that, the foreign firm can have positive demand 
only if the menu    offered to them is incentive-compatible in the sense that they 






( ) 1 1
~ ,q p  
offered to the low-type by the home firm. This means, for any    the foreign firm 
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* q c p n − = π . Profit maximization yields the quality level as   which 



























which is positive by our earlier assumption that 
4
3
≤ β . This completes the proof. 
b) By Proposition 2, for  , the home firm will offer the menu ( ()
* * * * δ > − o o c c ε − 2 p , ) 
to attract all consumers. The foreign firm then cannot have any positive demand. Its 
gross profit is thus zero if it enters the market. For a very small but positive entry cost, 
he opts not to enter the market.   
2
~ q
Hence proved.   
 
With foreign firm not entering the market for very large home market advantage of 
the home firm, and such decision being irreversible, the home firm targets to cater all 
consumers by offering the same separating menu as he did before liberalization only if 
(7) holds. The following diagram presents the complete characterization of 
post-liberalization equilibria for different degree of home market advantage. 
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Figure 3.    Configuration of Post-Liberalization Equilibrium 
 
 
4.  GAINS  FROM  LIBERALIZATION 
 
What appears from the above characterization of quality competition is that the gain 
for the domestic economy from trade liberalization should depend on the home market 
advantage of the home incumbent. Of course, the consumers will now get higher 
qualities of the varieties than they were offered pre-liberalization regardless of the nature RAJAT ACHARYYA  146
of post-liberalization equilibrium. The incumbent offers the higher competitive quality 
to the low-type consumers, if at all, under the threat of competition from the foreign 
entrant. This is the pro-competitive effect of liberalization. On the other hand, the entrant 
offers higher qualities (even when it offers discriminatory monopoly qualities) because 
of its superior technology as reflected in the lower marginal cost of quality enhancement 
) 1 ( < β . Competition also lowers the prices in all cases below the pre-liberalization 
levels. Domestic consumers are, therefore, unambiguously better off. At the same time, 
post-liberalization competition lowers the profit of the domestic firm. Gains from 
liberalization for the domestic economy, measured by change in total surplus or welfare 
is thus ambiguous.   
For home market advantage low enough,  [ ]
* , 0 δ δ ∈ , the home incumbent does not 
offer any menu and the market is monopolized by the foreign entrant. If distribution of 
domestic consumers over the two types does not satisfy (7), the entrant offers only one 
menu targeting only the high-type consumers and extracting their entire surplus. Since 
pre-liberalization, home firm earned strictly positive monopoly profit and the high-type 
consumers enjoyed strictly positive net utility, liberalization of the economy makes the 
home country unambiguously worse off in this situation.   
For distribution pattern satisfying (7), the entrant caters to both types by offering a 
separating or discriminating menu. But once again it extracts the entire surplus from the 
low-type consumers by pushing them to their reservation net utility, just as what the 
home incumbent did before liberalization, even though they are now offered a higher 
quality. The high-type consumers, on the other hand, gets a strictly positive net utility, 
whereas the home firm loses its entire sales. Thus, welfare of the domestic economy 
equals just the net utility that the high-type consumers enjoy from consuming the 
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* ] [ ) ( q n WF α α δ δ − = ≤ .                                           ( 2 9 )  
 
Pre-liberalization domestic welfare, on the other hand, equals the sum of home 
firm’s monopoly profit and the positive net utility that the high-type consumers get from 
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Thus, for sufficiently small value of c  the domestic economy loses from 
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. This means, when relative number 
of low-type consumers is very high as defined in (32), which is even higher than the critical 
size defined by (7), the welfare falls as the domestic economy is liberalized. This is easy to 
understand. In such a case, the loss of profit of the domestic firm in the low-end of the 
market alone is too high to be compensated by the gain that the high-type consumers have 
from liberalization. For the relative size of the low-end of the market smaller than what is 
defined by the strict equality in (32), such a loss is smaller than what the high-type 
consumers gain. But, still there is the loss of profit for the domestic firm from losing the 
high-end of the market. Thus, even then liberalization may lower of the domestic economy.   
Figure 4 below illustrates these welfare implications of liberalization for different 
distribution patterns, for home market advantage in the range  [ ]
* , 0 δ . 
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Figure 4.    Distribution Pattern and Gains from Liberalization for    []
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For intermediate range of home market advantage,  [ ]
* * * *,δ δ δ ∈ , on the other hand, 
the domestic market is segmented between the firms with the home incumbent catering 
the menu  ) ~ , ( 1 1 q p   to the low-type consumers and the foreign entrant offering the menu 
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*
2 p p = ) ~ ~ ( 1
*
2 2 q q + − α  The level of 
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F β α α α α − − + − + − − = .            ( 3 3 )  
 
The first term in (33) is the sum of surplus that the low-type consumers have and the 
profit that the home incumbent reaps by offering the menu  ) ~ , ( 1 1 q p  to them. The 
second and third term together measures the surplus that the high-type consumers enjoy 
by consuming the foreign high-quality variety. The pre-liberalization welfare defined in 
(30) can similarly be decomposed as: 
 
] ) ( ) ~
2
1 ~ [( ) ( ]
2
1
[ 1 1 2
2
2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2
2
1 1 1 1 a o a a o a A q q c c q n q n cq c q n W α α α α α α − − − − + − + − − = . 
                                                               (30b) 
 
Now the second term measures the surplus that the high-type consumers had before 
liberalization whereas the third term measures the profit that the home firm could reap 
by offering the menu   to  them.  ) ~ , ~ ( 2 2 q p




1a in the 
low-segment of the domestic market. Thus, the first term in (33) is greater than the first 
term in (30b). That is, the gain from liberalization for low-type consumers 
overcompensates the loss that the home incumbent incurs by raising the quality and 
lowering the price offered to them. Since   the second term in (33) is also 
greater than that in (30b) capturing the pro-competitive effect on the quality of the good 
offered by the home incumbent. Thus the only adverse effect of liberalization is the loss 
of profit for the home incumbent from the high-segment of the market. But, unless the 
number of high-type consumers is very large, such a profit loss cannot outweigh the 
gains that the domestic economy can enjoy from liberalization. Therefore, once again 
the size of sub-markets in this economy becomes relevant, though now in a more 
complicated way than in the earlier case. 
, 1a q
For even higher home market advantage,  , the domestic economy 
unambiguously gain from liberalization. Note that since the home firm offers the same 
quality   to the high-type consumers in both pre and post liberalization equilibrium, 
the total surplus generated in this high-end of the market - the home firm’s profit and the 
* * * δ δ >
2
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surplus enjoyed by high-type consumers - remains the same. But, in the low-end of the 
market total surplus increases since the home incumbent raises its quality to  .  1
~ q
A few inferences can be drawn from the above discussion. First, in general, the 
greater is the home market advantage, more likely that the domestic economy gains from 
liberalization. Second, demand patterns or relative size of sub-markets are important 
only for small and moderate home market advantage. 
 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
What we have demonstrated in this paper is that consumer targeting and market 
segmentation among firms in a sequential decision structure depends more on the nature 
of cost asymmetry than on the pattern of demand. Demand pattern becomes relevant 
only in two cases. First is when the home firm’s home-market advantage is too small. 
The foreign entrant then monopolises the home-country market and decides to cater to 
both types of consumers only when there is sufficient number of low-type consumers. 
Second is the case when the home market advantage of the local firm is moderately large 
  to enable it to profitably offer a menu to the high-type consumers but threat of 
foreign competition does not allow it to effectively discriminate among different types 
of consumers. In such a case, once again if low-type domestic consumers are sufficiently 
large in number as defined in (26) above, the local incumbent targets only these 
consumers and accommodates entry of the foreign firm in the high-end of the market. 
) (
* * δ δ >
On the other hand, though trade liberalization induces the local incumbent to 
enhance quality of its product (when it survives), the gain from liberalization critically 
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